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On the Semantic Contrast between Epistemic 
           May and Can
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I. Introduction 
 What I am concerned with in this paper is the question of 
incomplete synonymy between two epistemic modals: may 
and can. The two modals, in their epistemic senses, are often 
considered equivalent in that they both express possibility. 
Consider the following pair: 
 (1) John may be there now. 
 (2) John can be there now. 
Both (1) and (2) might be paraphrased by possible. 
 (3) It is possible that John is there now. 
The paraphrase indeed shows that the first two sentences 
might be equivalent, but are they completely synonymous? On 
closer investigation it will be found that there is a subtle but 
important difference between the possibilities expressed by (1) 
and (2). 
 Possibility is one of the central notions of traditional modal 
logic, and it is indispensable for the description of the 
meanings of the epistemic modals such as may and can. This 
logical notion, however, has to be reformed when we deal with 
the practical use of the modals. For in the actual utterances 
some pragmatic element or the subjectivity of the speaker 
plays an important part in the meanings of the modals. In this 
paper we would reconsider the definition of the notion of pos-
sibility in terms of pragmatics and attempt to account for the 
subjective aspect of the meaning of epistemic modals. 
 The discussion in the present paper would show us how 
important it is to make a clear distinction between a bare
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proposition and an assertion of it; the latter closely relates to 
an illocutionary force of an utterance or the speaker's 
 subjectivity", while the former is quite independent of them. 
Therefore the description of epistemic modality, which must 
be captured at the level of assertion, not proposition, would 
prove to be one of the most important problems in defining 
the boundaries between semantics  and pragmatics.
II. Two types of epistemic modality 
 Lyons (1977) distinguishes two types of epistemic modali-
ty: subjective and objective. For the distinction he gives an 
account on the basis of his tripartite analysis of an utterance. 
Throughout this paper we will examine his definition of 
epistemic modality and make use of it to describe the 
difference of epistemic may and can. 
  According to Lyons, there are three components in the 
structure of an utterance: the neustic, the tropic and the 
phrastic, or in our terms, the performative and modal 
components and the proposition. The structure might be 
figured like (4). 
 (4) (I say so  <  it is so  [p] >) 
  the neustic the tropic the phrastic 
Subjective and objective epistemic modality can be accounted 
for in terms of the qualification of the I-say-so and it-is-so 
components. The definition could be summarised in the table 
below.                     T
able 1.
I-say-so it-is-so
subjective epistemic modality qualified (unqualified)
objective epistemic modality (unqualified) qualified
1) To the term  'subjectivity' Akatsuka (1977) attaches the sense of  'unique ego's 
   expression' or  'expression belonging to a particular mind'.
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 By introducing a convenient notational system (5) which 
corresponds to (4), Lyons describes the subjective and 
objective epistemic modality more simply. 
 (5)  p 
The first full stop stands for the unqualified neustic, I-say-so; 
the second full stop stands for the unqualified tropic, it-is-so, 
and p for the phrastic, the proposition. In terms of the 
formula, subjective epistemic modality is represented as 
follows: 
 (6)  poss . p 
(6) can be read as  'Possibly, it is the case that p.' The objective 
epistemic modality is represented as: 
 (7) . poss p 
The reading is say that possibly it is the case that p.' 
  As for the system, we will present three major problems 
with which we are concerned throughout this paper. First we 
want to ask what modal expressions will correspond to these 
formulae. With this question let us observe the following ex-
ample: 
  (8) It may be raining in London. 
Lyons assumes that this utterance is ambiguous, that is, in (8) 
may can express not only subjective but also objective 
epistemic modality. But can any epistemic  m_odal have these 
two interpretations? 
  The second problem concerns another formula of  modality 
he suggests. 
 (9)  .  . (poss p) 
Unlike (6) and (7), (9) includes the form (poss p), which 
indicates a proposition that is derived by applying poss to p. 
Lyons explains that the formula represents complete objectifi-
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cation of  modality.2) But it is quite unclear how to distinguish 
between the two kinds of objective epistemic modality (7) and 
(9). 
 The last problem is how the distinction of the two kinds of 
epistemic modality, subjective and objective, could be demon-
strated by the empirical arguments. In order to verify the 
distinction, it is necessary to investigate closely the pheno-
mena which reflect the characteristics of each epistemic 
modality. 
 In the latter part of this paper we will discuss the semantic 
contrast between epistemic may and can, and the discussion 
would give us some valuable suggestion as to the problems 
stated above.
III. The semantic contrast between may and  can: subjective 
   and objective possibility 
 The difference between the meanings of epistemic may and 
can is adequately discussed in Leech (1971). He presents the 
following pair and discusses their semantic and contextual dif-
ference. 
 (10) The pound may be devalued. 
 (11) The pound can be  devalued.3) 
It is the difference of  'factuality' that we can find between the 
meanings of the two examples: the first has the factual 
meaning and the second has the theoretical meaning. Accord-
2) In contrast with the  'completely objectified' epistemic modality, Lyons 
   proposes, (7) can be thought of as being derived from (6) by  ` partial 
   objectification'. 
3) To clarify the contrast between (10) and (11) different paraphrases can be 
   given to them. 
   i) It is possible that the pound is devalued.  (=10) 
   ii) It is possible for the pound to be devalued. (=11) 
     = It is possible to devalue the pound.
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ing to Leech, (11), including can, can be uttered at any time 
since it only describes a theoretical possibility of the event, 
whereas (10), including may, expresses a factual possibility or 
the actual likelihood of the event and so it can only be uttered 
at a financial  crisis.4) 
  On the opposition of factual and theoretical possibility a 
further observation should be made: there is a difference in 
the speaker's participation in the meanings of the two modals. 
As for the meaning of may, the factual possibility, the speaker 
himself foresees the possibility and expresses it as his own 
opinion. Consequently we would refer to the possibility 
expressed by may as  'subjective possibility'. On the other hand, 
as for the meaning of can, the theoretical possibility, the 
speaker simply states an  'objective possibility'. Thus we would 
assume that there is a contrast of subjective vs. objective 
possibility between the meanings of epistemic may and  can.  5) 
 To show that the assumption is valid we now investigate 
some semantic properties of may and can which are to 
reflect the contrast clearly. It has been pointed out that, in 
contrast with root modals, epistemic modals have some 
syntactic and semantic restrictions as to their behavior with 
tense, negation, question, etc. To be noted here is that 
epistemic can often escapes those restrictions while epistemic
4) Joos (1964)  defines the meanings of epistemic may and can as  'contingent 
   potentiality' and  'adequate potentiality' respectively. Contingent potentiality 
    denoted by may expresses  'event is consistent with some of the circumstances 
   but not all', and adequate potentiality denoted by can expresses  'event is 
    consistent with all the circumstances'. 
5) The distinction of two types of possibility is proposed also in  Hermeren 
   (1978). He distinguishes POSS (1) and POSS (2). According to his account, 
 `POSS(1) may be s
aid to indicate the speaker's view of the likelihood of an 
   event occurring or having occurred,' and  'A sentence containing an exponent 
   of POSS(2) indicates that there is (ungraded) possibility of the occurrence of 
   an event or the existence of a state'.
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may is always affected by them. Now let us demonstrate the 
point. 
A. Past tense 
  Both may and can have a past tense form: might and could, 
but they are not equal with respect to the time reference. 
Consider the examples. 
 (12) What you say might be true. 
  (13) A situation like this might occur from time to time. 
  (14) Someday I might be worth murdering, but not now.  — 
      A. Christie, A Murder Is Announced 
In these examples might does not refer to past time but to 
present time. This use of might is called a  'tentative  use',6) and 
it expresses a present possibility. Epistemic  may, even if it is 
used in the past tense form, might, always refers to present 
 time.7) 
 With the examples (12)-(14) we should compare the 
following ones, which contain could. 
 (15) What you say could be true. 
 (16) In those days, a transatlantic voyage could be danger-
     ous. [Leech (1971)] 
 (17) "Why, I should say it was just as plain as plain could 
      be. The man in my compartment was the murderer. 
     Who else could he be?" — A. Christie, Murder on the 
     Orient Express 
Could in (15), like might in (12), is in a tentative use and 
expresses a present possibility. On the other hand  coulds in 
(16) and (17) all have the past time reference; they obviously 
represent a past possibility. For instance, (18) would be a 
rough paraphrase of (16).
6) Palmer (1974) 5.3.3. 
7) Might in (14) may be apparently considered to refer to future time, but it is 
   not the case. In (14) the possibility, represented by might, refers to present 
   time but the state or what is possible refers to future time; in otherwords, 
   (14) represents the present possibility of a future state.
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 (18) In those days, it was possible for a transatlantic voyage 
      to be dangerous. 
Consequently it is argued that epistemic an, but not may, can 
be used for the past time reference in the past tense form. The 
fact would be summarised as in (19). 
 (19) Past tense form for past time: May Can (±) 
B. Negation 
  In relation to the scope of negation, the two modals, may 
and can, exhibit a striking contrast. Compare (20) with (21). 
  (20) He may not be serious. 
 /It is possible that he is not  serious./ 
  (21) He can't be  serious. 
     /It is not possible that he is serious./ 
In (20), as the paraphrase shows, the modal is out of the scope 
of negation and not negates the proposition. On the other 
hand, in (21) not negates the modal itself or the modal is 
within the negative scope. Some further examples will follow: 
  (22) a. They may not come if it's wet. 
       /It is possible that they won'tcome if it's  wet./ 
      b. "But he mayn't have meant that to happen," 
       interrupted Miss Bunner eagerly. "It may have been 
        just a horrid sort of  warning  .  ." — A. Christie,A
       Murder Is Announced 
       /But it is possible that he didn't  mean  .  .  ./ 
  (23) a. He can't be working at this hour. 
       /It's impossible that he is working at this  hour./ 
      b. "It must come sometimes to  'jam today'," Alice 
        objected. "No, it can't." said the Queen. — L. Carroll, 
       Through the Looking Glass 
 Iles  impossible./ 
As the examples how, may is outside the scope of negation, 
while can is included in it. 
  (24) Within the scope of negation: May (—), Can (+)
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C. Question 
 It is well known that may, in its epistemic sense, does not 
occur in questions. 
 (25) *May Mary be praying now? 
 (26) *May John have been there yesterday? 
But the question containing epistemic can is very natural. 
 (27) Can Mary be praying now? 
 (28) Can they have missed the bus? 
Hence the question formation is also a restriction on the use of 
may but not can. 
 (29) Question: May (—), Can (+) 
D. Hypothetical use 
 Finally we will consider the hypothetical meaning of the 
modals. The following examples, which include hypothetical 
might and could, with their paraphrases, are cited from Leech 
(1971). 
 (30) a. If you loved me, I might marry you. 
     =b. If you loved me, it's possible that I would marry 
           you. 
 (31) a. If the astronauts momentarily lost radio contact 
        with earth, the whole mission could be ruined.
 =b. If the astronauts momentarily lost radio contact 
        with earth, it would be possible for the whole 
        mission to be ruined. 
Leech (1971:118) explains the difference of hypothetical 
meaning between might and could as follows:  'might ascribes 
unreality to that which is possible; while could ascribes 
unreality to the possibility itself.' Some further examples 
would clear up the point. 
  (32) a. She can tell you what might have happened and 
       what ought to have happened and even what
       actually did happen. — A. Christie, A Murder Is 
        Announced
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 I.  .  .what, it's possible, would have  happened  . .  ./ 
 b.  .  .  . and he threw such a wailing note of agony into 
     the weird music that, if we had not known it wasa 
      funny song, we might have wept. — J.K. Jerome, 
     Three Men in a Boat 
 I  .  .  ., it is possible that we would have  wept./ 
(33) a. Had you come to me sooner, I could have cured 
       you. 
 /.  .  ., it would have been possible for me to cure 
 you./ 
   b. There  would, be no point in collecting all the friends 
     and neighbors just to make it (=shooting)more 
     difficult. He could have shot her from behind a 
     hedge in the good old Irish fashion any day of the
     week, and got away with it. — A. Christie, A Murder 
     Is Announced 
 /It would have been possible for him to shoot 
 her  .  .  ./
These data indicate that in hypothetical use may is out of the 
scope of unreality but can is within it. Then we have (34) to 
summarise the  fact. 
 (34) Within the scope of unreality: May (—); Can (+) 
 The semantic properties (A)-(D) discussed so far will be 
summarised in the following table. 
                   Table 2.
May Can
A. Past tense form for past time +
B. Within the scope of negation +
C. Question +
D. Within the scope of unreality +
The table shows a striking contrast between epistemic may and 
can on the semantic properties presented above, and on closer 
examination we have to notice that the contrast distinctly
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 reflects the characteristics of subjective and objective possi-
 bility. Then we will investigate what each property suggests as 
 to the meaning of the modals. 
   To start with, epistemic may does not have a past tense 
 form for the past time reference. This shows that may 
 expressing subjective possibility is directly dominated by the 
 speaker and is outside the domain of tense; it is related to 
 speaker-now. A similar conclusion will  be drawn from the 
 other properties. Epistemic may is out of the negative scope, it 
 is not used in questions and it is outside the scope of unreality 
 in its hypothetical uses. These facts tell that the modal is the 
 subjective expression of the speaker which can never be 
 negated or questioned or hypothesized. 
   On the other hand, epistemic can escapes every restriction 
 that epistemic may is subject to. Can has a past tense form 
 for past time, it is within the scope of negation, it occurs in 
 questions and it is included in the scope of unreality in 
 hypothetical uses. From all these facts it follows that the 
 possibility expressed by epistemic can, unlike that of may, is 
 part of the propositional content and the speaker simply 
 describes an objectively possible event. 
   In conclusion we assume that the semantic difference 
 between the two epistemic modals may and can is adequately 
 described in terms of the distinction between subjective and 
 objective possibility; the former is directly related to the 
 speaker's subjectivity and the latter is considered as an element 
 of a proposition. 
   However, the contrast between the meanings of may and 
 can could not be observed in every case, for each of the two 
 modals often trespasses on the other's semantic territory. For 
 example, epistemic can, especially in the negative form can't, 
 frequently expresses ubjective possibility.
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 (35) The boy can't have spoken English then. 
 /It is impossible that the boy spoke English  then./ 
In contrast, some  mays, though very rarely, represent objective 
possibility. Lyons (1977) accepts the following example: 
  (36) If it may be raining, you should take your umbrella. 
Though in (36) may occurs in if-clause, where no subjective 
expression is permitted, this utterance is interpretable, accord-
ing to Lyons, provided that may is taken to express objective, 
rather than subjective, epistemic modality. Although it is very 
doubtful whether (36) is acceptable, we would admit that 
some use of may could express objective possibility. Con-
sequently we must restate the conclusion: the contrast 
between subjective and objective possibility corresponds to the 
essential semantic difference between epistemic may and can. 
  In the final place we will once again refer to the formulae 
that Lyons presents to describe the epistemic modality. As for 
objective possibility, as we have argued, we consider that it has 
to be captured at the level of proposition. Lyons proposes two 
types of objective epistemic modality, but we suppose that 
there is no need of such a distinction from our point of view. 
If we interpret the notion of proposition more loosely, we can 
include both objective pistemic modalities in one category. 
 As for subjective possibility, it is very difficult to in-
corporate it in the analysis of an utterance. Though we 
observe that subjective pistemic modality has some relation 
to the performative component (I-say-so) of an utterance, it is 
very questionable whether the description of Lyons is ade-
quate, which is given with the qualification only of the 
performative component.
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IV. Conclusion 
 In order to explain the semantic contrast between epistemic 
may and can we have proposed the distinction between 
subjective and objective possibility. The distinction roughly 
corresponds to that of Lyons between  subjective• and objective 
epistemic  modality. 
 When we deal with the modality, it is important to 
distinguish the assertion from the proposition; in relation to 
the former but not the latter the modality performs its 
function, that is, the modal expressions have roles only in the 
actual utterance. In this sense, objective possibility, which can 
be thought to be a part of a proposition, may be considered 
not to fulfil the true function of the modality. 
 In the discussion of the epistemic modality the most 
difficult problem is how to formalize such a mentalistic notion 
as  'subjectivity'. Obviously the subjectivity of the speaker is in 
some way correlated with the illocutionary force of an 
utterance or the performative and other pragmatic elements, 
but it seems very hard to explicate their relations. It is ex-
pected that further studies will be made on the discussion.
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